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with them.I. Introduction
It is important to formulate incentive policies for agriculture
by considering the broader context in which they operate and not
merely by looking at the direct effects on particular agricultu-
ral activities. The size of agriculture in developing countries
implies that any policy directed towards this sector inevitably
affects other parts of the economy profoundly, since the various
sectors must compete for limited resources. Conversely, measures
to promote and protect other sectors can severely hamper agricul-
tural development. In this context, the domestic terms of trade
between agriculture and the rest of the economy, which result
from inward-looking industrialization strategies emerge as a key
issue as they affect the level and composition of agricultural
output, the adoption of new technologies and the migration of
labour from farms to urban areas.
This fact is ignored by the partial-equilibrium approach commonly
used in justifying assistance to import-competing industry. How-
ever, protectionism not only causes cost pressures on the unpro-
tected sectors but also has a differential impact on domestic
prices for tradeables and non-tradeables. Several studies have
shown that policies to protect industry increase the price of
protected industrial products and of nontraded goods compared to
unprotected tradeables [e.g. World Bank (1986), Valdes (1986)].
Quantitative results suggest that it is mainly the agricultural
sector, particularly the export-oriented subsector, which suffers
from inward-looking industrialization . Moreover, many agricul-
ture-specific (direct) interventions to help certain commodities
or producers are reactions to (indirect) policies originating
elsewhere in the economy, and attempt to compensate for the over-
all macroeconomic stance .
In this paper, the impact of trade and industrialization policies
on the level and structure of incentives for total exports, total
agricultural exports and individual agricultural export commodi-
ties in the Zimbabwean economy is investigated. To do this, a
three-sector general equilibrium model developed by Dornbusch(1974) and successfully used in other quantitative studies [e.g.
Garcia (1981) on Colombia; Oyejide (1986) on Nigeria; Tshibaka
(1986) on Zaire; Greenaway/Milner (1986) on Mauritius; Bautista
(1987) on the Philippines; Mlambo (1989) on Zimbabwe; Herrmann et
al. (1990) on Peru and Malaysia] is applied. It will be shown
that a fairly high share of- industrial protection is shifted to
producers of agricultural exportables as an implicit tax. This
result conforms with findings of other studies on the subject.
However, government intervention in producer prices has generally
been favourable to agricultural production in Zimbabwe . The
question then arises whether indirect policies are sufficiently
strong to counteract those direct policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the theoretical model and explains the shifting prin-
ciple. Section III describes the empirical methodology required
to operationalize the model as well as the data sources used. In
Section IV, estimates of the incidence parameters are presented
and discussed. Subsequently, the estimates of the incidence para-
meters are combined with external information on nominal protec-
tion of manufacturing and agricultural exportables to produce
true tariff and subsidy rates in Section V and total tariff rates
in Section VI. Finally, in Section VII, major results are summa-
rized and conclusions are drawn.
II. The Analytical Framework
Following Dornbusch (1974) we consider a simple general equili-
4
brium model based on the following assumptions :
- a small open economy with initially balanced trade;
- constant factor endowments and real income;
- three sectors, importables (M), exportables (X) and non-
tradeables (N);
- substitutability in production and consumption between
home goods and both traded goods;
- zero cross price elasticity between traded goods;- 3 -
- policy interventions take the form of uniform tariffs (t) on
imports and/or uniform subsidies (s) on exports;
- initial (free trade) prices for all goods are unity, i.e. PM =
Px = PN = 1.
As Dornbusch (1974) shows, equilibrium in the non-traded goods
market implies trade balance equilibrium and therefore the equi-
librium properties of the model can be examined in terms of equi-
librium in either market. Thus, general equilibrium following a












e and 5 are compensated supply and demand price elasticities for
non-traded goods with respect to i, i = X,N,M and a hat (~) de-
notes proportionate changes.
Given the system above it can be established [see Greenaway and
Milner (1987)] that the proportionate change in the price of
non-tradeables (PN) required to restore equilibrium is given by
*• »T M4 «« '1-bM/J.-- \ "3 /
N M X
where omega (Q) is the incidence parameter (O<Q<_1) indicating the
extent of the shifting of the tax burden. The effect of trade and
industrial policies on the structure of relative prices depends
therefore on the structure of protection and the value of the
incidence parameter:
- If Pu = t = Pw = s (uniform nominal protection/promotion of im-
M X ~ ^
portables and exportables) , then P.. = PM = Pv, i.e. relative
N M X
prices are unaltered and there is no true or relative protec-
tion of any sector (irrespective of the value of Q).- 4 -
- If Pv = s = 0 but Pu - t, then O£P,,t£Pu as X M N M
- If Pu = t = 0 and Pv = s, then 0<JPM<SPv as M X NX
With Q=l for instance, import protection raises the price of both
M and N by the same percentage whereas the price of X remains
unaffected; there is zero "true protection" of importables rela-
tive to non-tradeables but "true disprotection" of exportables
relative to non-tradeables. In this case the burden of import
protection falls wholly on the exportables sector. At the other
extreme, if Q=0, import protection does not alter the prices of
either N or X, the nominal tariff is equal to the true protective
rate on importables. Although exportables are not disprotected
relative to non-tradeables, the burden of import protection falls
equally on exportables and non-tradeables. Thus, in the import
protection case the index Q can be interpreted as an indicator
for the shifting of the burden of protection on exportables .
Conversely, with Q=l, export promotion leaves the price of im-
portables and non-tradeables unaffected. The true subsidy is
equivalent to the nominal subsidy and the burden of export promo-
tion falls equally on producers of importables and non-traded
goods, who have to pay higher prices for exportables. If Q=0 ex-
port promotion raises the prices of both X and N relative to M;
there is zero true subsidization of exportables relative to home
goods but true disprotection of importables.
III. Application of the Model
Equation (4) expressed the relationship between changes in the
price of importables, exportables and non-tradeables. Expanding
(4) and rearranging we derive:
% " V •
 Q <*M - V
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Since the shifting model analyses proportional changes in the
price of one group of commodities relative to another, the appro-- 5 -
priate estimating procedure is to transform equation (5) to a
double logarithmic specification, viz,
ln(PM/Pv)
NX
constant + Q In (PM/PV) + u.
M X t
(6)
As shown by Garcia (1981), this equation may be disaggregated as
necessary to take account of several exportable and importable
subsectors. The information required to estimate omega is price
movements of importables, exportables and non-tradeables.
Ideally, one would rely on producer prices.
In estimating the global and disaggregated forms of the incidence
parameter, an important modification is required before equation
(6) can be used. Estimations based on time-series data would
violate the assumption of constant real income and of a balanced
external account. Hence, income (Y) as measured by GDP and bal-
ance of trade (BOT) have to be included as additional variables
in the regression equations. There are then two basic equations
to be estimated.
ln(PN/Px)fc = constant + Q ln(PM/Px>t + a BOTt +






+ a BOTfc + In Yfc + (8)
where Px- is either the price index for individual
export commodities or
agricultural
an export-share-weighted price index for
all agricultural exportables recognized and PVMa is an export-




The regression equations were estimated on the basis of annual
data for 1966-87. Initially, ordinary least squares (OLS) tech-
niques were used. For all equations estimated there was, however,- 6 -
evidence of positive autocorrelation. In each case, therefore,
the model was re-estimated using the Cochrane/Orcutt iterative
procedure.
In addition to total exports (X), estimates are produced for
Zimbabwe's major agricultural export goods, i.e. maize (XM),
coffee (XC), cotton (XCO), tobacco (XT) and beef (XB) as well as
for all five agricultural export categories taken together (XA).
Yearly information on unit import and unit export values in
Zimbabwean dollar (Z$) from the Central Statistical Office (CSO)
and on producer prices for individual agricultural export commo-
dities from Rukovo (1990) together with information on export
revenues according to the standard international trade classifi-
cation (SITC) from CSO were used to construct price indices for
individual export commodities, total agricultural exportables and
other exportables (XN). For each of the export categories, four
variables are used as proxies for home goods: the building mate-
rial price index (PM1K the component of domestic workers' wages
in the consumer price index (CPI) (PN_), the food component of
CPI (PMo) and the composite CPI for higher and lower income urban
families (P .). Moreover, the export price index for total agri-
cultural exports and other exports was calculated with different
weights, explanatory variables were taken out and the dynamic
structure of the relationship was explored by estimating a dis-
tributed lag model. Sources and data for all the variables used
as well as the weighting scheme applied are given in Appendices
1-3.
IV. Empirical Results
The results of estimating the shift parameter are presented in
Tables 1 and 2. The former gives details for estimates using a
basic model where the building material price index (
pN1) appro-
ximates price movements for home goods whilst the latter presents
omega estimates for alternative model specifications. The depen-
dent variable for each equation is listed in the top line of the
tables and the estimated coefficients for each independent vari-- 7 -
Table 1: Estimates of the Incidence Parameter Q for Total Exports, Total Agricultural Exports and Individual Agri-


















































































































































Values in parentheses are t-values, Rho is the regression coefficient of the Cochrane/Orcutt procedure, R is
the corrected coefficient of determination, F the F-value and DW the Durbin-Hatson-statistic.
Source: Own computations. P ., P and Px are taken from Appendix 1. P_. is constructed as a weighted export price
index for the five individual export commodities where the respective earnings in 1980 are used as
weights. Analogous, P is an export price index for all other exports not included in P_.. See Appen-
dices 2 and 3 for the calculation of the price indices.- 8 -
able (or model) is found by looking at the corresponding cell
under the relevant line heading.
The statistical characteristics for all regression results are
quite good. The estimated Durbin-Watson statistics mean that the
null hypothesis of no positive autocorrelation cannot be re-
jected. The overall explanatory power of all models is satis-
factory, the F-statistics are significant at the 1 percent con-
fidence level in all cases, and the estimates of the incidence
parameter are significantly greater than 0 at conventional levels
in all but three models.
From the results obtained for the value of Q, it can be concluded
that a major proportion of the incidence of commercial policy
interventions designed to protect the importables may be shifted
to the export sector in the form of an implicit export tax. As an
example, the estimate of Q in the basic model (Table 1) suggests
that the share of incidence borne by the exportable sector is 76
percent. In general, this implies that Zimbabwe's home goods and
importables are fairly close substitutes in both consumption and
production whereas the relationship between home goods and ex-
portables is weak. It also reflects that Zimbabwe's exportables
are fairly inelastic in supply. Hence, they tend to absorb a
large proportion of the tariff incidence in the form of reduced
rents to the fixed factors of production.
The estimated value of the incidence parameter for total agri-
cultural exports (0.65) is lower than for total exports (0.75).
This implies that a one percent tariff will decrease the relative
price of total exports by 0.75 percent, but the relative price of
agricultural (non-agricultural) exports will fall marginally less
(more) than total exports. Obviously, technological and demand
characteristics are such that there is less substitutability
between non-agricultural exportables and home goods than between
agricultural exportables and home goods . This pattern of inci-
dence contrasts with empirical evidence for other developing
countries where traditional agricultural exportables exhibit a
larger degree of incidence than non-traditional industrial ex-- 9 -
ports [e.g. in the Ivory Coast; see Greenaway (1989)]. It accords
well with a priori theorizing since these other exports are
mainly natural resource-based and other constraints like the
foreign exchange allocation system hamper adjustment.
Within the agricultural export sector estimates of the incidence
parameter in the basic model vary between 0.43 for beef and 0.76
for coffee with those for maize, cotton and tobacco lying between
these two extremes. These results contrast with the findings of
Mlambo (1989) and can be explained by differences in the data
base used. Whereas Mlambo used export price indices [Mlambo
(1989), p. 255, Table 6, footnote] we relied on producer prices
[Rukovo (1990)], since these are the prices which determine prod-
ucers
1 decisions. As clearly shown by Rukovo (1990), nominal pro-
tection is high and varies largely for beef. This explains the
large discrepancy between Mlambo's estimate of 0.88 and our esti-
mate of 0.43. Obviously, beef producers (mostly large scale com-
mercial farmers) are aware of the eroding effect of increasing
home-goods prices and successfully lobbied for higher nominal
subsidies to compensate for disprotection by commercial policy.
Modifying the basic model as indicated in Table 2 has only a
minor effect on the regression results. As can be seen, the in-
cidence parameters are fairly stable across different model spe-
cifications. They are generally high and range from 0.66 to 0.83
for total exports; they are equally concentrated for total agri-
cultural exports, varying from 0.53 to 0.70. There is no clear
pattern with regard to food exports (maize, coffee and beef) and
cash crops (cotton and tobacco). The range of Q for coffee ex-
ports is between 0.65 and 0.84. The incidence is much lower for
beef (0.29 to 0.47), while that for maize, cotton and tobacco is
nearly the same lying between 0.57 and 0.76.
The modifications of the basic model stress the robustness of the
estimates of Q. The general conclusion is that the incidence of
commercial policy in Zimbabwe is high. This has important impli-
cations for the level and structure of incentives.- 10 -
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis on the Incidence Parameter Q, Zimbabwe 1966-1987
h —*
Model
Model 1: Basic model
Model_2: Alternative


























































































Model 4: Different speci-
fTcadon of Fm and P^
a) weights of 1978
b) weights of 1985
Model_5: Different speci-
fication of the income
variable ilagged one
period)























































Values in parentheses are t-values. - The basic model iModel 1) is the model shown in Table 1. All models were
corrected for autocorrelation with the Cochrane/Orcutt iteration procedure.
Source: Own computations based on data presented in Appendix i.- 11 -
V. True Protection of Imports and Exports
As shown by Greenaway (1989), estimates of the shift parameter
can be combined with information on nominal import tariffs and
nominal export subsidies to calculate "true tariff rates" and
"true subsidy rates", i.e.- the extent to which the prices of
importables and exportables rise or fall relative to the nume-
raire, non-tradeables. Thus, the true tariff rate t* is defined
as:
t* = !M = i±t c PM l+d •"•
N




where d = P.. = QPM + (1-Q) Pv N M X
d = Qt + (l-Q)s (11)
In equations (9) to (11) d is the proportional change in the
home-goods price and t and s refer to the nominal tariff rate and
nominal subsidy rate respectively.
Clearly, if importables and home goods are perfect substitutes
(Q=l) then d=t and t*=0 whereas the sign (and value) of s* is
ambiguous depending on s t. In this case importables enjoy no net
protection relative to home goods. Exports are truly discrimi-
nated against if nominal tariffs exceed nominal subsidies. On the
other extreme, if exportables and home goods perfectly substitute
for each other (Q=0), then d=s and s*=0. Here, too, it may well
turn out that importables are truly disprotected despite nominal
protection. This is the case, if the increase in the home-goods
price resulting from export subsidies exceeds nominal tariffs on
importables.- 12 -
Rukovo (1990) provides details on nominal taxes and subsidies for
three agricultural exportables (maize, beef and cotton) and Erzan
et al. (1989) computed average tariff rates for total manufactur-
ing. It is interesting to use this information to generate esti-
mates of true protection in Zimbabwe. The actual procedure for
estimating true tariff and _ subsidy rates is to use the shift
parameters for maize, beef and cotton reported in Table 1 to
estimate d from equation (11) and then substitute this into equa-
tions (9) and (10) to get t* and s*. The results of this exercise
together with the nominal tariff and subsidy rates, the shift
parameters used and the changes in the home-goods price are re-
ported in Table 3.
According to these figures the 10% average tariff on manufactured
products would lead to changes in the average price for home
goods in the range of -35% to +140% depending on the size of the
shifting parameter and the level of nominal subsidy. Clearly, the
assumption of symmetrical substitutability between individual
agricultural exportables and total home goods underlying the
calculations in Table 3 leads to an exaggeration of the price
pressure on non-tradeables. We cannot expect that subsidies or
taxes on individual agricultural exports in fact induce quantity
adjustments in the market for home goods sufficiently large to
produce such pronounced price changes as reported in Table 3. It
nevertheless pays to discuss the results in Table 3 first since
they demonstrate more clearly that the actual, net effects of
simultaneously operating conflicting policies considerably differ
from the intended effects. We then discuss the estimates pre-
sented in Table 4 where we assumed that repercussions from export
subsidies for individual agricultural exports on the home-goods
market can be neglected.
From Table 3, it can be seen that true tariff rates range from
-54% to +69% depending on the size of the shift parameter and the
level of nominal duties on exportables. Other things equal, t*
will increase as Q falls, and will increase as s falls. Thus, if
we compare maize and beef in 1984/85, we find that t* falls from
28% to -43%. The lower shift parameter (0.43 rather than 0.65)B i b I i o f h e k -
des institute fur Weitwirtschah
- 13 -













































































































a Home-goods prices, true tariffs and true subsidies are calculated on the basis of the incidence
parameters estimated in the basic model. The nominal tariff rate t is an unweighted average tariff
rate for total manufactures as calculated by Erzan et al. (1989). - Unweighted nominal subsidy
rates are taken from Rukovo (1990). They are based on export parity prices by accounting for in-
ternal marketing and transport margins. Information on nominal protection rates for coffee and
tobacco was not available.
Source: Own computations based on the results given in Table 1.- 14 -
should mean a higher true tariff since importable prices rise to
a greater extent vis-a-vis non-tradeables. This however is more
than offset by the change in s from an export tax of 14% for
maize to an export subsidy of 94% for beef. The apparent perver-
sity of this conclusion serves to emphasize the limitations of
simultaneously attempting to protect import substitutes and pro-
mote exports. The fact that true protection is likely to be less
than nominal protection provides a motive for demanding further
nominal protection. The demand for protective barriers tends to
be a continuous process, which never seems to satisfy importers.
According to the figures in Table 3 nominal subsidy rates on
exports varied between -59% and 123% for maize, between -69% and
238% for beef and between -33% and 31% for cotton in the period
1981/82-1986/87. The true subsidy rates range from -52% to 49%
depending on the value of the shift parameter and the value of
nominal duties/subsidies on exportables. Other things equal, s*
will increase as Q falls and s raises [equations (10) and (11)].
Thus, if we compare the true subsidy rates, resulting from a
combined protection of manufactures and maize exports, we find
that s* varies between -52% (1984/85; s = -59%) and 49% (1986/87;
s - +123%). The lower shift parameter for beef (0.43 rather than
0.65) should mean a higher true subsidy since non-tradeables
prices rise to a lesser extent as a result of import protection.
To give an example, if, both, maize and beef are nominally sub-
sidized by 18% in 1981/82 we would expect a higher true subsidy
for beef than for maize. However, from equations (10) and (11)
the resulting true subsidy rates are 5% for maize and 3% for
beef. Obviously, the dampening effect of a smaller omega on non-
tradeables prices is more than offset by the increase of non-
tradeables prices resulting from the subsidization of exports.
This follows immediately from an analysis of equation (11).
The case where the implicit tax is at a maximum is that which
pertains to cotton in 1981/82 and 1983/84. This follows from the
relatively high shift parameter - which means that non-tradeables
prices rise to a greater extent - and in part from the presence
of explicit export taxes on this cash crop. In this case "dis-- 15 -
protection" brought about by export taxes is enhanced by nominal
protection of manufacturing imports.
Where agricultural exports are nominally subsidized, they are
also truly subsidized. In other words, disprotection from a 10%
import tariff on manufactures is insufficient to offset protec-
tion granted by nominal export subsidies. However, there are
cases where an import tariff appears to lead to an implicit sub-
sidy on exportables. Beef in 1986/87, e.g., is a case where true
taxation is lower than nominal taxation. How can this be ex-
plained? The import duties will cause an increase in the price of
importables and a fall in the price of beef - both relative to
the price of home goods. The export tax on beef will, in turn,
decrease the price of beef and increase the price of importables
- both relative to the price of home goods. Now, if export taxes
are larger than import duties (|s|>t), the equilibrium price of
home goods will fall by an amount that is less than s but greater
than t. This results in lower (higher) true taxes (tariffs) than
nominal taxes (tariffs) on exports (imports).
As already mentioned above, the true protection rates are over-
estimated because the markets for the individual agricultural
exportables are relatively small and sector-specific interven-
tions are unlikely to generate resource movement and spending
effects large enough to cause the marked pressure on home-godds
prices reported in Table 3. Production-share-weighted nominal
protection rates would have been preferable but were not possible
to construct given the absence of appropriate information. We,
therefore, decided to re-calculate true tariffs and true subsi-
dies under the assumption that export-subsidy induced feed-back
effects to the market for non-tradeables can be neglected. In
this case the equation for calculating changes in the prices of
home goods reduces to:
PM = Qt (12)
N
and the true tariff rates and true subsidy rates computed from
equations (9) and (10) provide lower or upper bounds on the ac-
tual rates. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 4.- 16 -


































































Source: Own computations based on Tables 1 and 3.
According to these figures, the true tariff on importables is
always positive and ranges from 3% to 5% depending on the value
of the shift parameter. Since we ruled out repercussions by ex-
port subsidies but the shift parameter falls, we observe an in-
crease in the true tariff for manufacturing in the case of beef.
For all cases the estimated true tariff is substantially less
than the nominal tariff.
In the case of exportables true subsidies range from 224% for
beef in 1983/84 to -62% for maize in 1984/85. In all scenarios
import protection either increases nominal taxation or reduces
nominal subsidies thereby reinforcing or counteracting sector-
specific policies. However, since nominal subsidies and nominal
tariffs are high and the incidence parameter is similar for dif-
ferent export commodities a 10% import tariff is unlikely to
change the fundamental structure of protection in the agricul-
tural sector.- 17 -
VI. Total Protection of Agricultural Exports
The incidence parameters estimated for Zimbabwe indicate the
extent to which a one percent tariff distortion in the manu-
facturing sector is shifted on to producers of agricultural
exportables. When multiplied by the prevailing tariff rate for
manufactures, they provide an estimate of the implicit tax rate
on these agricultural products. On the other hand, the negative
of the nominal rate of protection provides an estimate of nominal
taxation. It measures the tax/subsidy rate which can be mani-
pulated by government and therefore indicates the intended or
explicit taxation/subsidization of agricultural products. Taken
together, implicit taxes and explicit taxes or subsidies indicate
total taxation of agricultural output (TTR) [Garcia (1981)].
Formally, this implies:
TTR. = NTR. + QNPRM (13)
11 M
where NTR. is the negative nominal protection rate (NPR.) of a
particular agricultural export commodity, Q is the incidence
parameter and NPRW is the average tariff rate on manufactures.
NTR. is positive if the commodity is nominally taxed; negative if
it is subsidized. Hence, the total tax or subsidy rate is deter-
mined by
(i) the magnitude of the import tariff;
(ii) the size of the shifting parameter, and
(iii) the extent of nominal protection.
The regression results of the basic model (Table 1) suggest that
the shifting of the tax burden differs only slightly across the
three agricultural exportables maize, beef and cotton. Thus,
differentials in protection between the three agricultural
exportables are mainly attributable to differential nominal
protection. This is confirmed by the different tax/subsidy rates
reproduced in Table 5.- 18 -
Given the estimated average incidence parameters of 0.65 for
maize and cotton and 0.43 for beef, the corresponding implicit
taxes on these commodities emanating from the average import
tariff of 10% are 6.5% and 4.3% respectively. Total taxes are
made up of the direct (explicit) and implicit taxes.
From the results given in Table 5 one can conclude that the
prevailing tariff rate for total manufacturing has only a minor
impact on agricultural incentives. Low nominal import protection
together with similar incidence parameters for the three agri-
cultural exports means that the level and structure of protection
in the agricultural export sector is not affected profoundly by
indirect protection. Furthermore, nominal tariffs and subsidies
on agricultural exportables are very high. As indicated in the
last section this may induce changes in the prices for non-
tradeables. The repercussions from these price changes may be
sufficiently large to offset the small negative impact brought
about by industrial protection.











































































Source: Own computations based on Rukovo (1990), Erzan et al. (1989) and the incidence parameters
given in Table 1.- 19 -
VII. Summary and Conclusions
It was the objective of this paper to investigate the effects on
incentives to agricultural exports of policies to encourage im-
port substitution and export promotion in Zimbabwe. To estimate
the effect on prices of a system of tariffs and subsidies on
imports and exports, a simple model incorporating importables,
exportables and home goods was used and different protection
measures were calculated. The major results that emerge from our
analysis can be summarized as follows:
1. The empirical results obtained for Zimbabwe confirm the.
findings obtained in other studies on the subject. In parti-
cular, they underline the importance of macroeconomic reper^-
cussions of commercial policy for the export sector. For
example, a uniform tariff of 10 percent on all imports con^
stitutes a tax equivalent of 7.6 percent on all exports. In
other words, with the same amount of exports, an exporter-
can obtain 7.6 percent less of nontraded commodities.
2. The estimates of the incidence parameters for total agricul-
tural exports and individual agricultural exports are highly
significant, stable across different model specifications
and generally range above 0.6. This implies that a large
share of a uniform import tariff is shifted on to producers
of agricultural exportables as an implicit tax.
3. The true subsidy rates and true tariff rates are generally
lower than the nominal rates. This emphasises the limita-
tions of simultaneously attempting to protect import sub-
stitutes and promote exports. While commercial policy autho-
rities can fix individual tariffs and subsidies, they have
little or no control over the incidence of the tariff and
subsidy structure.
4. From the calculations of total taxes, it can be concluded
that a uniform tariff on imports of 10 percent represents a
tax on maize and cotton of 6.5 percent and on beef of 4.3- 20 -
percent. If exports are taxed directly as is the case for
cotton in most of the years investigated, the total tax is
even higher (ranging between 8.5 percent and 39.5 percent
for cotton).
The analysis suggests that direct government intervention in
producer prices has generally been favourable to maize and beef
exporters whereas cotton exports show no clear protection
pattern. Moreover, the average nominal tariff rate on manu-
facturing has been rather low during the period of investigation.
Low nominal import protection together with similar incidence
parameters for the three agricultural exportables means that the
level and structure of protection in the agricultural export
sector has not been affected profoundly by indirect protection.
This result contrasts with findings for other LDCs where we
observe not only indirect discrimination but also direct dis-
crimination by government through agricultural pricing policies.
However, in order to evaluate Zimbabwean incentive policy com-
prehensively it would be necessary to recognize also the over-
valuation of the Zimbabwean dollar which is estimated to result
in a net transfer out of agriculture [Masters (1989)].- 21 -
Notes
1 For the economies of Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile,
Brazil, and Peru Clements and Sjastaad (1984) estimated that
exporters in all these countries, and producers of import-com-
peting foodstuffs in some of them, have paid at least half of
the cost of industrialization programs. For Zimbabwe, the
current exchange rate control system is estimated to result in
a total net transfer out of agriculture on the order of half a
billion dollars; an amount which by far exceeds the entire
budget of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Re-
settlement [Masters (1989)].
2 Empirical findings from the World Bank's project on "The Poli-
tical Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policies" suggest that
the indirect effects of general macroeconomic policies domi-
nate the direct effects from sector-specific agricultural
policies in many of the LDCs and NICs investigated. The real-
exchange rate effects of general macroeconomic policies are
calculated there and the price effects of direct and indirect
policies are compared. Descriptions and first results on the
comparative study, which encompasses 18 detailed country
studies are summarized in Krueger/ Schiff/Valdes (1988) and
Schiff (1988). Published country studies include Avillez/
Finan/Josling (1988) on Portugal, Greene/Roe (1989) on the
Dominican Republic, Jansen (1988) on Zambia, Garcia/Llamas
(1989) on Colombia, Dethier (1989) on Egypt, Jenkins/Lai
(1989) on Malaysia, Tuluy/Salinger (1989) on Morocco,
Siamwalla/Setboonsarng (1989) on Thailand and Moon/Kang (1989)
on Korea.
3 See Rukovo (1990) and Takavarasha (1990) for analyses of di-
rect agricultural policy in Zimbabwe.
4 These are the assumptions which characterize the special case
analyzed on pages 181 et seq.
5 A more detailed description and illustration of the shifting
principle and the concept of true protection is provided by
Greenaway/Milner (1987).
6 This presumption is confirmed by the results of the following





































3 BOT + 0.2373 lnY
(-0.52) (0.41)
Rho = -0.1999; R* = 0.73; F = 14.83; DW = 1.89
(-0.21)
As indicated by the regression results the incidence parameter
for non-agricultural exports is higher than the estimator for
agricultural exports (Table 1). This implies that the substi-- 22 -
tutability between importables (exportables) and home goods is
higher (lower) for non-agricultural exportables than in the
case of agricultural exportables.- 23 -
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the food component of CPI
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. For beef, export earnings from meat, fresh, frozen or chilled and
prices for other
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an analogous manner. The weights for the indices were calculated
various issues. This information and the formulas for calculating the price indices are given : m Appendices
Source: Column (1): Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; column (2): IMF (1988); columns (3)-(8): CSO, various issues; columns (9)—(13): Rukovo (1990); columns (14)-
(34): calculated with data given in columns (8)—(13) and Appendix 2.- 28 -
















































































































































Source: CSO: Quarterly Digest of Statistics, various issues.
Appendix 3: On the Calculation of Price Indices for Total Agricultural Exports and Other Exports
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